Strategic Issues and International Relations

April 13, 2010

Terror Attack in Bombay

Filed under: Terrorism and Pakistan — Tags: — karandixit @ 5:09 am

 Mumbai (Bombay) came under terrorist attack on 11/26/2008; the attack was planned and executed by Pakistani military. The Islamic terrorists killed 173 unarmed civillians. There were reports that female hostages were raped before being tortured and executed by Islamic terrorists.

While the terror was underway, Pakistani terrorists contacted their handlers in Pakistan several times to receive orders. The conversation between Pakistani terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan was intercepted by Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research & Analysis Wing).

Here is the audio clip of the conversation:

http://s8.photobucket.com/albums/a11/cybersurg/brf/?action=view&current=26-11-aud.flv

Please see the  English translation of the conversation as translated by Bharat Rakshak Forum members below. T stands for terrorist and C stands for controller.

0:00
C: You will be successful if you get shot by a bullet. Allah and heaven are waiting for you.
T: Inshalla Inshalla (God willing God willing)

0:07
C: Yes do it, Make them sit up, facing forwards, and shoot them on the back of the head.

0:16
C: Your work must be such that the whole world will get scared. (whole world will fear you)

0:23
C: OK, did you kill the man who was with you in the boat?
T: Yes yes?
C: The man who was on the boat, on the launch, did you kill him?
T: Yes yes, we killed him.
C: How did you kill him?
T: We slit his throat. (The exact words refer to an Islamic ritual slitting of the throat)

0:39
C: I mean that this is a fight between Islam and the non-believers, I mean, we are the people whom allah has chosen to protect our religion from the non-believers.

0:51 Taj Palace Hotel
C: In Bombay, many people are injured, many are dead, and they are saying that approximately fifty people are in the city. There is firing going on in the entire city (Laughing in the background), the whole city is on fire, people are dying.
So, by the grace of Allah, Allah has given you a very important job, OK?

T: Alhamdulillah (Praise to god)
C: So my dear, at this time…

1:15
C: God willing, allah has brought heaven very close to you, god willing.
T: God willing
C: In reality, the whole world is watching you and will not forget you.

1:25
C: Your work must be such that the whole world will get scared. (whole world will fear you)

1:38 (Nariman House)
C: But, as I was telling you, every one person that you kill here is equal to 50 that they kill there.

1:42 Nariman House
C: Don’t worry Jayna, just sit back and relax and, don’t worry and just wait for them to contact, OK?
Hostage: Yes sir.
C: And save your energy for good days yes? If they, if they contact right now, maybe you gonna, ah ah, you know, celebrate your Sabbath with your family.

1:59 Oberoi Trident

Fahadulla
Image

T (Fahadulla): As-Salāmu ‘Alaykum (Peace be upon you)
C: Wa `Alaykum Salaam (and peace be upon you too), sir, how are you Fahadulla dear, is everything good?
T (Fahadulla): Alhamdulillah (Praise to god), Brother Abdul Rehman has departed to god.
C: Really? Is he near you?
T (Fahadulla): Yes he’s close by.
C: May god accept his martyrdom.
T (Fahadulla): The room is on fire, if the media is transmitting this. I can see them through the bathroom windows.
— (Fahadullah was hiding in the bathroom of one of the rooms of the Oberoi Trident hotel) —

— grenade explosion —

2:25 Oberoi Trident
C: My dear, make sure that you do not get in a situation where you are arrested. (My dear, make sure that you are not arrested)
T (Fahadulla): Insha’Allah Insha’Allah. (God willing god willing)

2:35 Oberoi Trident
C: Fahadulla, dear. Is there any possibility of fighting, that you could come out, get in front, throw a grenade, and try to get out of there. So that you can go forward.
T (Fahadulla): I’ve already thrown both my grenades.

–Gunshot—

C: Be brave my dear, don’t be afraid, Insha’Allah (God willing) if you get shot by a bullet, you will only be successful.
T (Fahadulla): Yes sir.
C: Allah and heaven are waiting for you.
T (Fahadulla): Insha’Allah
C: May allah protect you. Be brave my son.

C: And please keep the phone in your pocket.

–Grenade explosion – – beeping sound – Gunshots—

C: Hey

— Gunshots —

C: Hello, Fahadulla? Fahadulla?

3:29 Nariman House
Babar Imran
Image

Nasir @ Abu Umar
Image

Transcript between the Controller and Babar Imran. Babar Imran doesn’t understand Punjabi very well it seems, so the conversation is in Urdu. Also Babar Imran is a leader of sorts, and is instructing his companion on how to fight.
Mumbling in the background
C: Listen.
T (Babar Imran): yes yes.
C: Aah,
(Instructions at the background on the controller side)
C: Eliminate these people, get rid of them. The assault may begin at any time, and these people might be left behind.
T (Babar Imran): No, Insha’Allah (God willing), right now there is no movement on my side.
C: No No, don’t wait. You don’t know when the firing will start, what will be the situation, what the firing will be like, how intense.

Instead of waiting, keep these people in such a way that the bullet does not repel back onto you from the wall the in front.
T (Babar Imran): Insha’Allah Insha’Allah (God willing, god willing)
C: I am holding the line.
C: Do it do it, I am listening. Do it.
T (Babar Imran): Shall we fire?
C: Yes do it, Make them sit up, facing forwards, and shoot them on the back of the head.
T (Babar Imran): Actually I had sent Umar (Nasir @ Abu Umar) to sleep, I was thinking that I’ll also sleep for a while. Actually he wasn’t feeling well.
C: No No
T (Babar Imran): I’ll call you back in half an hour, then we will do it.

4:39 Nariman House
T (Babar Imran): As-Salāmu ‘Alaykum (Peace be upon you)
C: Alhamdulillah (Praise to god), Yes brother.
T (Babar Imran): Please don’t be angry, I’ve changed the layout, I was thinking of that for a while. Now in your presence
C: Have you done the job yet or not?
T (Babar Imran): Now in your presence. I was actually waiting for your call. Now in your presence by your orders.
C: Do it, come on. Do it. Bismi-llāh (In the name of God).
T (Babar Imran): Yes sir, and…
C: Do it. Bismi-llāh (In the name of God).

Mumbling in the background

T (Babar Imran): {whispering}

— Gunshot – –

T (Babar Imran): Hello
C: Yes sir, yes sir.
T (Babar Imran): OK
C: Yes, that was one?
T (Babar Imran): Both together.

5:18 Nariman House
Helicopter’s rotor noise
T (Babar Imran): I was also thinking that today is a Friday, that we should have the final fight today.

— Gunshot – –

C: Use all your might.

–Gunshot—
C: Shoot, shoot, shoot, shoot, get him shoot.

T (Babar Imran): The firing has started, the firing has started.
C: Do it, do it, do it.
T (Babar Imran): The firing has started from across us.
T (Babar Imran): Umar, take cover, take cover.

— Gunshots – –

T (Babar Imran): Ho-, Ha-, Ha-, They are firing into our room. In our room. They are firing into our room.

6:00 Nariman House
T (Babar Imran): As-Salāmu ‘Alaykum , As-Salāmu ‘Alaykum (Peace be upon you, Peace be upon you)
C: As-Salām, Wa `Alaykum as-Salaam, (And peace be upon you too) yes sir.
T (Babar Imran): I’ve been hit in the firing, pray for me.
C: Yes sir?
T (Babar Imran): I’ve been hit in the firing, pray for me. For my protection
C: Allah tala, Where have you been hit? Where have you been hit?
T (Babar Imran): I…
C: Where have you been hit?
T (Babar Imran): I’ve been hit on my arm, hit on my foot.
C: Allah, Allah tala, may allah tala protect you. Their people are also getting injured, they are being taken to the hospital
T (Babar Imran): We have killed a commando at the first entrance. Pray for me, so that I may attain martyrdom
C: Alhamdulillah, alhamdulillah (Praise to god, Praise to god),
T (Babar Imran): Khuda hafiz (Goodbye – May God be your Guardian)

January 1, 2010

Organizational Factors

Filed under: Kargil Review — karandixit @ 8:17 pm

This table is an excerpt from an article by D. Ramana. You can view the original article here:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-6/ramana.html

Organizational Factors

Factor

Characteristic

Definition

Effect

Applicable

Comments

O-1

Organizational

atrophy

Organizational

phenomenon afflicting mostly large and established firms where such endogenous factors as

sunk cost, the dynamics of polictical coalitions, and propensities for precedents become

normative standards, places means prior to objectives

Structural

ossification and conceptual rigidities; stunted communications; stalled feedback;

resulting in two way obstruction of critical information flow. Threat – rigidity effects

ensue, including restrictions imposed on information processing, adherence

X

The

entire Kargil Report Commission illustrates the extent of this factor.

O-2 Politicking

and heirarcy orientation

Dominance

of bickering and manipulative parochail interests characterize corporate culture.

Prevalent interpersonal and inter- group conflict. Decision criteria are predicated on

percieved orientation and politics of the organization.

Prevents

information sharing; impedes cooperation resulting in ineffective information processing.

Critical inforamtion is withheld, obstructed or concealed, subject to power-sharing.

Biased decision making.

X IB

director not sharing with colleagues.

O-3 Centralization of authorities A tendency among managers to centralize powers, particularly under stress. Elongating ones span of control, hence capacty to notice, let alone tackle,

EWS is critically curtailed.

X RAW chief doubling as JIC chairman.
O-4 Over-reliance

on SOP

Reluctance

to challenge, let alone alter, inefficient SOP, irrespective of fast changing

circumustances

Adherence

to SOP channels, mangerial perceptions and actions into automated and modular course, so

that EWS that do not fit in are uncermoniously overlooked. This also results in managers

seeking soutions closest to the problem, e.g. diminished creativty

X The

infiltration hypothesis is a symptom of this factor.

O-5 Compartmentation Information sharing on the basis of ‘need to know’ principle. X IB director not sharing with colleagues.

Psychological Factors

Filed under: Kargil Review — karandixit @ 8:14 pm

This table is an excerpt from an article by D. Ramana. You can view the original article here:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-6/ramana.html

Psychological Factors

Factor

Characteristic

Definition

Effect

Applicable

Comments

P-1

Fear

of Superiors

The

tendency to subject one’s ego to superiors regardless of inherent strengths. Reluctance to

stand by one’s stances owing to superiors’ overarching charisma and/or elevated heirachial

position.

Lack

of openness; restriction of information and ideas intake; ‘One best way’ precludes

additonal options

x

 

P-2

Dearth

of suspicion

Over-confidence

derived from proven past successes, innate proclivity to undertrate underlings’ or peers’

criticism.

Hinders

modofocation of prevalent conception, regardless of the objective value of threats.

Prevents counterintitutive boudary scanning, thus focusing solely on normal trends

x

Indian

agencies repeatedly keep postulating the infiltration thesis.

P-3

Paranoid-megalomaniac

leadership

Also

dubbed the "Bull-Frog Syndrome," charcterized by a need for insatantaneous

self-gratification, and selfishness. ‘In-charge’ rather than leadership perception of

mangement.

Inconsistent

policies mirroring a single paramount view, thus annuling capacity to identify problems

incompatible with leaders’ decreed stance.

 

Could

be effect of IAS/IPS cadre running the show

P-4

Cognitive

Dissonance

The

absence of consistency between the knowledge, ideas, and belifs which make up one’s

cognitive system. The human tendency is to avoid dissonance by changing inforamtin about

reality rather than by changing one’s beliefs according to information.

Tendency

to reduce the value of incomig warning indicators when these contradict dominant

preconception that surprise is unlikely. This propensity features prominently when other

obstacles, such as slow rate of EWS, ambiguity of available warnings, or a l

x

Possible.

Infiltration thesis promoted constantly.

P-5

Heuristic

judgments

Individuals’

tendency to embark on mental shortcuts when confronting complex situations chiefly through

mechanisms of availability and representativeness.

Misjudgement

of complex realities.

 

Dogmatic

adherence to infiltration evenafter the enquiry started.

P-6

Escalating

commitment to a chosen course of action and the "Bridge on the River Kwai"

syndrome

A

decisionmaking process whereby individuals persist in their commitment to a previously

chosen, though evidently unproductive, strategy in order to justify past investments.

Psychologically, people cognitively distort the unpropitious results to make the

Preclusion

of views challenging the pursued strategy knowingly obscures one’s capacity to sift

through incoming EWS or prevents readiness to do so altogether.

 

N/A

P-7

Over-confidence:

The Drowned and Boiled Frog Syndrome

Mangerial

self-centeredness and arrogance predicated on true or asumed sucessess(Boiled Frog) or n

one’s long standing postion as a major marketplace player (Drowned Frog)

Blindeness

to internal weaknessess, disregard for environmental risks, and insufficient search for

further explanations to incoming warnings.

 

Definte

possibility. Combined with mirroring.

P-8

Managerial

stress

A

state of duress stemming from pressurized circumustances combining percieved threat,

percieved opportunity, and time pressure.

Cognitive

and judgemental faculties severly narrowed. Focus is placed on a narrower scope, therfore

only seemingly ‘burning issues’ are attended to.

 

Possible.

RAW chief doubling as JIC chairman. Also POK-2 tests reaction could have taxed resources.

P-9

Self-

enactment

Managerial

arrogance and ego-centric self-image. The tendency for managers to enact an environment

constituting an extension of their preferences rather than ratioally assess threats and

opportunities.

Advancement

of self-interests, truncation of understanding of wider contexts, and surrendering the

future to the way in which attendant conditions evolve.

 

Possible.

Due to the cadre based nature of leadership.

P-10

Conflictual

and introverted managerial style

A

tendency to favor internal rather than external viewpoints. People who do not get along

with others.

Emphasis

on own postions and preferences. Ignoring of useful advice and failure in employing

oppurtunities furnished by collabrations and exchange of views.

x

Single

agency concentration and lack of independent scrutiny.

P-11

Aversion

to discrepant information

Neagtive

receptivity of bad news through ignorance, rejection, bolstering of prevalent attitudes.

Misperception

of incoming threats, ineffective crisis mitigation.

x

See

above.

P-12

Group-think

Dynamics

within a small and cohesive group charcterized by conformity where the propensity to reach

unanimous decisions overshadows critical judgement

Often

an involuantary collective misperception of reality results in the pursuance of issues

percieved important by the group, rather than grappling with individual stances,

irrespective of their potential importance.

x

See

above.

Strategic Factors

Filed under: Kargil Review — karandixit @ 8:05 pm

This table is an excerpt from an article by D. Ramana. You can view the original article here:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-6/ramana.html

Strategic

Factors

Factor

Characteristic

Definition

Effect

Applicable

Comments

S-1

Cover

Using various means to conceal the true intentions and

capablities of the initiator

Decreasing number of "signals" are available

to the victim.

X

Pak resort to covert action

S-2

Deception

Employing deception ploys aimed at baffling the victim regarding the

intiatior’s true intentions and capabilities.

Delibrate increase of the amount of ‘noise’ the victim is subject to.

X

Numerous chaotic signals emanating from POK.

S-3

"Cry Wolf" syndrome

Repeated warnings without effectuating the threat.

Erosion of policy-makers’ receptivity to warnings and of

intelligence officers’ provision of additional warnings.

n/a

S-4

The time lag factor

A time lag effect between the initiators’ preparedness to surprise and the

victim’s readiness to properly respond to the threat, owing to the time required to

collect, estimate and implement decisions.

The victim’s inherent ability to respond in good time to threat is gravely

impaired.

X

There was time lag. However Gen. Pal’s deployment of forces enabled

localizing the intrusion.

S-5

The intiation factor

The initiator decides to take action or not.

The initiator takes action only when conditions are

favorable (e.g. high likelihood of surprise)

X

Pak intiated the action in Jan. ’00.

Political Factors

Filed under: Kargil Review — karandixit @ 7:51 pm

This table is an excerpt from an article by D. Ramana. You can view the original article here:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-6/ramana.html

Political

Factors

Factor

Characteristic

Definition

Effect

Applicable

Comments

Pol-1

Politicking of information processing

Intentional use of scarce information to gain political

power

Prevents information sharing, impedes cooperation.

X

IB director passing on information to higher-ups instead

of sharing with JIC.

Pol-2

Policymakers act as their own intelligence officers

Rejection of professional assessment

Prevalence of non-professional estimations and viewpoints.

n/a

Pol-3

Instinctive acceptance of intelligence estimate

Ineffective quality-control of evaluation; lack of

political ‘second opinion’

Dogmatic, monolithic, and often inappropriate concepts.

X

Possible. NDA ministers did not have sufficient

governance experience.

Pol-4

Intelligence intervention in policy making

Bypassing policymakers’ evaluations, policy delineation and implementation

by unauthorized parties.

Emergence of dogmatic and monolithic concepts, usually on the basis of

insufficient information; communication and policymaking hindrances.

n/a

Pol-5

Politicization of professional product

Use of professional estimates to advance parochial

political interests.

Distortion of professional estimates; distrust between

professional and political echelons.

n/a

Pol-6

Commitment to political agenda

Policymakers’ adherence to political agenda.

Hampers receptivity to professional estimates inconsistent with the agenda.

X

Possible. Lahore euphoria might have influenced some policy makers. May not

be key ones. KRC is emphatic that it did not influence the GOI or the agencies.

Pol-7

Political intervention in the intelligence process

Delibrate political interference with professional

intelligence processes aimed at matching the final product with policymakers’ interests.

Subjective intakeof interests into the seemingly

objective intelligence estimate.

n/a

December 19, 2009

Daoud Gilani / David Headley Case

Filed under: Terrorism and Pakistan — karandixit @ 10:39 pm

This table gives a time line with respect to special events in Pakistan, David Coleman Headley and special events in US.

If you are not familiar with David Coleman Headley, please read this information:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Headley

Date Special Events in Pakistan Headley Special Events in US Comments
1958 Gen. Ayub Khan takes over Praetorization of Pak politics
30 June 1960 Headley born in US to Serrill Headley and Pak Diplomat High elite in Pak society
1965-69 Indo Pak war-’65. Stalemate.

Gen Yahaya Khan takes over 69

Military takeover from another military leader
1971 Indo-Pak war results in surrender of Pak Army.

Formation of Bangla Desh

1972 ZA Bhutto Return of civilians
1974 Nazariya –e- Pakistan announced Joins Hasan Abdal Cadet College. Befriends Rana Military prep school
1977 Gen. Zia takes over Serrill brings Headley back to Philadelphia, US. Runs Khyber Pass bar and restaurant. Mother’s life style in extreme contrast to Islamic life in Pakistan.
1978 Soviet Takeover of Afghanistan US supports the mujhadeen against the FSU Pakistan becomes the frontline state
1988 Headley arrested in FKT, with 2kg heroin. Agrees to become approver for DEA. End of Cold War Major drug courier.
1989 Convicted and sentenced to 4 yrs and released in 1992 Light sentence due to approver for DEA
1989-1995 Repeated parole violations Disturbed individual.
1995 Arrested again and sentenced to six months for drug habits
1997 Arrested in NYC, for smuggling drugs from Pakistan Repeat offender
1998 Pakistan explodes nukes after India Sentenced for 15 months and 5 yrs probation for helping DEA.
1999 Kargil War and gamble Headley granted parole to visit Pakistan and eventually released Headley becomes devout. Grows beard and attends mosques etc. most likely beginning of his change.
2000 Headley visits Pakistan as undercover agent/informant of DEA See above.
2001 Taleban Afghanistan attacked by US – 9/11 Headley probation terminated. Should have been till 2004 9/11 attack on USA Start of Headley’s work for US
Feb. 2002 Headley joins L-e-T
Aug. 2002 Headley attends L-e-T camp
April 2003

Dec 2003

Headley attends L-e-T camp Shows rigor in his training
Feb 2006 Headley changes name and moves to Chicago with Pak wife and four children Change of mission from his regular drug smuggling and DEA work.
June 2006 Applies and gets visa from Indian consul Headley opens a branch for Rana’s business in India.
Sep. 2006 Headley visits Mumbai(1st Mission) Headley meets Bhatt around this time. Bhatt earns Headley’s respect for his role in movie, The Suicide Bomber.
Feb. 2007 Headley visits Mumbai(2nd Mission)
Sep 2007 Headley visits Mumbai(3rd Mission)
April 2008 Headley visits Mumbai(4th Mission) Headley takes boat trip around Mumbai’s coastal areas.
July 2008 Headley visits Mumbai(5th Mission) Shows increasing recce
26 Nov 2008 Mumbai attacked

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