Organizational Factors

This table is an excerpt from an article by D. Ramana. You can view the original article here:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-6/ramana.html

Organizational Factors
Factor	Characteristic	Definition	Effect	Applicable	Comments
O-1	Organizational atrophy	Organizational phenomenon afflicting mostly large and established firms where such endogenous factors as sunk cost, the dynamics of polictical coalitions, and propensities for precedents become normative standards, places means prior to objectives	Structural ossification and conceptual rigidities; stunted communications; stalled feedback; resulting in two way obstruction of critical information flow. Threat – rigidity effects ensue, including restrictions imposed on information processing, adherence	X	The entire Kargil Report Commission illustrates the extent of this factor.
O-2	Politicking and heirarcy orientation	Dominance of bickering and manipulative parochail interests characterize corporate culture. Prevalent interpersonal and inter- group conflict. Decision criteria are predicated on percieved orientation and politics of the organization.	Prevents information sharing; impedes cooperation resulting in ineffective information processing. Critical inforamtion is withheld, obstructed or concealed, subject to power-sharing. Biased decision making.	X	IB director not sharing with colleagues.
O-3	Centralization of authorities	A tendency among managers to centralize powers, particularly under stress.	Elongating ones span of control, hence capacty to notice, let alone tackle, EWS is critically curtailed.	X	RAW chief doubling as JIC chairman.
O-4	Over-reliance on SOP	Reluctance to challenge, let alone alter, inefficient SOP, irrespective of fast changing circumustances	Adherence to SOP channels, mangerial perceptions and actions into automated and modular course, so that EWS that do not fit in are uncermoniously overlooked. This also results in managers seeking soutions closest to the problem, e.g. diminished creativty	X	The infiltration hypothesis is a symptom of this factor.
O-5	Compartmentation	Information sharing on the basis of ‘need to know’ principle.		X	IB director not sharing with colleagues.

Psychological Factors

This table is an excerpt from an article by D. Ramana. You can view the original article here:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-6/ramana.html

Psychological Factors
Factor	Characteristic	Definition	Effect	Applicable	Comments
P-1	Fear of Superiors	The tendency to subject one’s ego to superiors regardless of inherent strengths. Reluctance to stand by one’s stances owing to superiors’ overarching charisma and/or elevated heirachial position.	Lack of openness; restriction of information and ideas intake; ‘One best way’ precludes additonal options	x
P-2	Dearth of suspicion	Over-confidence derived from proven past successes, innate proclivity to undertrate underlings’ or peers’ criticism.	Hinders modofocation of prevalent conception, regardless of the objective value of threats. Prevents counterintitutive boudary scanning, thus focusing solely on normal trends	x	Indian agencies repeatedly keep postulating the infiltration thesis.
P-3	Paranoid-megalomaniac leadership	Also dubbed the "Bull-Frog Syndrome," charcterized by a need for insatantaneous self-gratification, and selfishness. ‘In-charge’ rather than leadership perception of mangement.	Inconsistent policies mirroring a single paramount view, thus annuling capacity to identify problems incompatible with leaders’ decreed stance.		Could be effect of IAS/IPS cadre running the show
P-4	Cognitive Dissonance	The absence of consistency between the knowledge, ideas, and belifs which make up one’s cognitive system. The human tendency is to avoid dissonance by changing inforamtin about reality rather than by changing one’s beliefs according to information.	Tendency to reduce the value of incomig warning indicators when these contradict dominant preconception that surprise is unlikely. This propensity features prominently when other obstacles, such as slow rate of EWS, ambiguity of available warnings, or a l	x	Possible. Infiltration thesis promoted constantly.
P-5	Heuristic judgments	Individuals’ tendency to embark on mental shortcuts when confronting complex situations chiefly through mechanisms of availability and representativeness.	Misjudgement of complex realities.		Dogmatic adherence to infiltration evenafter the enquiry started.
P-6	Escalating commitment to a chosen course of action and the "Bridge on the River Kwai" syndrome	A decisionmaking process whereby individuals persist in their commitment to a previously chosen, though evidently unproductive, strategy in order to justify past investments. Psychologically, people cognitively distort the unpropitious results to make the	Preclusion of views challenging the pursued strategy knowingly obscures one’s capacity to sift through incoming EWS or prevents readiness to do so altogether.		N/A
P-7	Over-confidence: The Drowned and Boiled Frog Syndrome	Mangerial self-centeredness and arrogance predicated on true or asumed sucessess(Boiled Frog) or n one’s long standing postion as a major marketplace player (Drowned Frog)	Blindeness to internal weaknessess, disregard for environmental risks, and insufficient search for further explanations to incoming warnings.		Definte possibility. Combined with mirroring.
P-8	Managerial stress	A state of duress stemming from pressurized circumustances combining percieved threat, percieved opportunity, and time pressure.	Cognitive and judgemental faculties severly narrowed. Focus is placed on a narrower scope, therfore only seemingly ‘burning issues’ are attended to.		Possible. RAW chief doubling as JIC chairman. Also POK-2 tests reaction could have taxed resources.
P-9	Self- enactment	Managerial arrogance and ego-centric self-image. The tendency for managers to enact an environment constituting an extension of their preferences rather than ratioally assess threats and opportunities.	Advancement of self-interests, truncation of understanding of wider contexts, and surrendering the future to the way in which attendant conditions evolve.		Possible. Due to the cadre based nature of leadership.
P-10	Conflictual and introverted managerial style	A tendency to favor internal rather than external viewpoints. People who do not get along with others.	Emphasis on own postions and preferences. Ignoring of useful advice and failure in employing oppurtunities furnished by collabrations and exchange of views.	x	Single agency concentration and lack of independent scrutiny.
P-11	Aversion to discrepant information	Neagtive receptivity of bad news through ignorance, rejection, bolstering of prevalent attitudes.	Misperception of incoming threats, ineffective crisis mitigation.	x	See above.
P-12	Group-think	Dynamics within a small and cohesive group charcterized by conformity where the propensity to reach unanimous decisions overshadows critical judgement	Often an involuantary collective misperception of reality results in the pursuance of issues percieved important by the group, rather than grappling with individual stances, irrespective of their potential importance.	x	See above.

Strategic Factors

This table is an excerpt from an article by D. Ramana. You can view the original article here:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-6/ramana.html

Strategic Factors
Factor	Characteristic	Definition	Effect	Applicable	Comments
S-1	Cover	Using various means to conceal the true intentions and capablities of the initiator	Decreasing number of "signals" are available to the victim.	X	Pak resort to covert action
S-2	Deception	Employing deception ploys aimed at baffling the victim regarding the intiatior’s true intentions and capabilities.	Delibrate increase of the amount of ‘noise’ the victim is subject to.	X	Numerous chaotic signals emanating from POK.
S-3	"Cry Wolf" syndrome	Repeated warnings without effectuating the threat.	Erosion of policy-makers’ receptivity to warnings and of intelligence officers’ provision of additional warnings.	n/a
S-4	The time lag factor	A time lag effect between the initiators’ preparedness to surprise and the victim’s readiness to properly respond to the threat, owing to the time required to collect, estimate and implement decisions.	The victim’s inherent ability to respond in good time to threat is gravely impaired.	X	There was time lag. However Gen. Pal’s deployment of forces enabled localizing the intrusion.
S-5	The intiation factor	The initiator decides to take action or not.	The initiator takes action only when conditions are favorable (e.g. high likelihood of surprise)	X	Pak intiated the action in Jan. ’00.

Political Factors

This table is an excerpt from an article by D. Ramana. You can view the original article here:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-6/ramana.html

Political Factors
Factor	Characteristic	Definition	Effect	Applicable	Comments
Pol-1	Politicking of information processing	Intentional use of scarce information to gain political power	Prevents information sharing, impedes cooperation.	X	IB director passing on information to higher-ups instead of sharing with JIC.
Pol-2	Policymakers act as their own intelligence officers	Rejection of professional assessment	Prevalence of non-professional estimations and viewpoints.	n/a
Pol-3	Instinctive acceptance of intelligence estimate	Ineffective quality-control of evaluation; lack of political ‘second opinion’	Dogmatic, monolithic, and often inappropriate concepts.	X	Possible. NDA ministers did not have sufficient governance experience.
Pol-4	Intelligence intervention in policy making	Bypassing policymakers’ evaluations, policy delineation and implementation by unauthorized parties.	Emergence of dogmatic and monolithic concepts, usually on the basis of insufficient information; communication and policymaking hindrances.	n/a
Pol-5	Politicization of professional product	Use of professional estimates to advance parochial political interests.	Distortion of professional estimates; distrust between professional and political echelons.	n/a
Pol-6	Commitment to political agenda	Policymakers’ adherence to political agenda.	Hampers receptivity to professional estimates inconsistent with the agenda.	X	Possible. Lahore euphoria might have influenced some policy makers. May not be key ones. KRC is emphatic that it did not influence the GOI or the agencies.
Pol-7	Political intervention in the intelligence process	Delibrate political interference with professional intelligence processes aimed at matching the final product with policymakers’ interests.	Subjective intakeof interests into the seemingly objective intelligence estimate.	n/a